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Different Values but Similar Backgrounds: 
How Relativism Influences Naïve Realism in Everyday Disagreements 
Beverly G. Iniguez Conrique, M.S. 
University of Pittsburgh, 2020 
 A functioning society requires that people work together and cooperate with each other, 
even when people hold opposing viewpoints. Yet, Americans today find themselves in 
intractable disagreements and conflicts. This study investigates whether moral, epistemic, and 
situational relativism predicts reactions to everyday disagreements. First, we investigated 
whether moral, epistemic, and situational relativism can be measured and distinguished from one 
another as three dimensions that are empirically separate and reliable. Second, we delved into 
how each of these three facets relate to naïve realism and judgments of people with 
opposing views. Findings suggested that our proposed instrument of moral, epistemic, and 
situational relativism is distinct, valid, and reliable. Further, these three types of relativism 
significantly predicted reactions to disagreement. While moral and epistemic relativism were 
associated with less hostility toward those with opposing views, situational relativism was 
surprisingly associated with more hostility toward those who held opposing views. There is 
a growing importance of understanding disagreement across a broad range of topics and 
potential ways to mitigate hostility due to differences in viewpoints. The present study offers 
important insights for creating future socially constructive behavioral interventions to target 
conflicts exacerbated by disagreement. 
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“Difference must be not merely tolerated, but seen as a fund of necessary polarities between 
which our creativity can spark like a dialectic. Only then does the necessity for interdependency 
become unthreatening.”                                                                                             – Audre Lorde 
 
 
A functioning society requires that people work together and cooperate with each other, 
even when people hold opposing viewpoints. Yet, Americans today find themselves in intractable 
disagreements and conflicts – from whether Black lives matter (Alba, 2020; Parker et al., 2020; 
Pew Research Center, 2020a), to whether people should wear face coverings during a global 
pandemic (Lizza & Lippman, 2020; Montanaro, 2020; Pew Research Center, 2020b; Tierney, 
2020), and even to accepting the results of the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election (Fandos & 
Cochrane, 2020). On the whole, the U.S. is more polarized today than at any point in its recent 
history (Pew Research Center, 2014, 2019a), and signs of social harmony and common ground 
within politics are few and far between (Pew Research Center, 2017; Peters, 2018).  
While disagreement can be a catalyst for compromise and negotiation (Fisher et al., 2011), 
American society’s most pressing issues have become the most complex and the most disagreed 
upon, leading to many civic and legislative standstills (Abramowitz & McCoy, 2019; Abrams, 
2019; Knowles & Tropp, 2018; Pew Research Center, 2014; Rauch, 2016). Further, this bleak U.S. 
political landscape often engenders polarization, partisan intransigence, negative affect towards 
political opponents, and even the potential for political instability which can lead to political 
violence (Davis, 2019; Goldstone et al., 2010; Kalmoe & Mason, 2018). Given that this political 
conflict is in and of itself destructive and is further related to increased economic inequality, less 
political trust, and less ability to govern (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2015; McConnell et al., 2018), 
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the need for a foundation in which people can understand others in socially constructive ways is 
more pressing now than ever before.  
Although there are many reasons for the increasing disagreement in the U.S. today, one 
contributor is the tendency for people to view their own stances as superior to the views of people 
who disagree, even when issues are seemingly noncontroversial (Skitka et al., 2005; Skitka, 2010; 
Skitka et al., 2015; Van Prooijen & Krouwel, 2020). This tendency often leads people to judge 
those who disagree with them as significantly more biased than themselves or members of their 
own groups (Ditto et al., 2019; Pronin et al., 2002; Pronin et al., 2004). This is in line with the 
people’s propensities to believe their perceptions of reality are objective — when they are in fact 
subjective (Gilovich & Ross, 2016; Schwalbe et al., 2020). This tendency to mistake subjectivity 
for objectivity is known as naïve realism. Naïve realism facilitates inferences that those who 
disagree must be either irrational, uninformed, or at worst, immoral, and sometimes all three 
(Griffin & Ross, 1991; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Robinson et al., 1995; Ross & Ward, 1996; Ross et 
al., 1977; Ward et al., 1997). Taken together, people are inclined to overemphasize disposition and 
minimize situational constraints when making judgments of others, especially when they hold 
opposing viewpoints (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Harman, 1999; Jones, 1990; Jones & Davis, 1965).  
Given that negative dispositional attributions hinder being able to judge a person even-
handedly, it is imperative to investigate the ways people approach opposing viewpoints to 
positively counteract the negative downstream consequences of naïve realism. As such, we posit 
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that and empirically test whether relativism1 is a predictor of naïve realism. While people are often 
naïvely realistic in everyday situations, there are also instances where, despite differences in 
opinion or the existence of long-term conflicts, people are able to compromise or bridge divides 
(Čehajić-Clancy & Bilewicz, 2017, 2020). Of course, disagreements and conflicts are not 
inevitable, but the need to understand novel predictors of what drives people to work together 
despite holding opposing viewpoints is critical, especially in times where democracy itself is on 
the line.  
Therefore, we posit that relativism, as developed in the philosophy and anthropology 
literature (Hall & Raimi, 2018; Herskovitz, 1955; Hollis & Lukes, 1982; Nussbaum, 1997; Wilson, 
1970), is 1) an empirically novel way to understand how people perceive others with opposing 
viewpoints, and further, 2) a predictor of why people make either hostile or benign judgments of 
opposing others vis-à-vis naïve realism. In the present work, we propose to create an instrument 
to measure three distinguishable types of relativism: moral, epistemic, and situational. We suggest 
that people make harsh or benign judgments of others based on how they view another person’s 
viewpoints as morally, factually, and situationally valid. Further, we provide empirical support 
that moral, epistemic, and situational relativism each distinctly predict naïve realism, 
operationalized holistically across a broad range of hypothetical disagreements.  
We argue that people not only judge those who disagree with them, but that this tendency 
may be stronger in some rather than others. For those for whom reacting in naïve realistic ways is 
 
1 Relativism is broadly defined as “the view that truth and falsity, right and wrong, standards of reasoning, 
and procedures of justification are products of differing conventions and frameworks of assessment and that their 
authority is confined to the context giving rise to them” (Gowans, 2012, p. 1). 
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not as pronounced a tendency, it is possible that relativistic (as opposed to absolutist) ways of 
thinking both 1) exist within people and 2) predict less (as opposed to more) harsh and swift 
judgments of those with opposing viewpoints. Further, these three facets of relativism, as they 
relate to morality, epistemology, and situationism, may themselves relate to one another in how 
they shape a person’s individual judgments of those who disagree with them.  
The present study has two aims.2 First, it will seek to understand how moral, epistemic, 
and situational relativism can be measured and distinguished from one another as three dimensions 
that are empirically separable and reliable. Second, it will explore how each of these three facets 
predict naïve realism, as defined holistically by reactions to disagreement with others on several 
topics, namely apolitical, taboo, moral, and political issues. In the following sections, we will 
briefly review the social psychological literature on naïve realism (Griffin & Ross, 1991; Nisbett 
& Ross, 1980; Robinson et al., 1995; Ross & Ward, 1996; Ross et al., 1977; Ward et al., 1997). 
Next, we will present support for the idea that there are multiple and distinguishable facets of 
relativism, and that these constructs are viable in the ways people interpret the world and more 
importantly, interpret disagreements and people who hold disparate views. We will then present a 
 
2 We conducted this study in late March of 2020 after COVID-19 had been declared a pandemic (WHO, 
2020). Given this, we also included a priming condition to investigate whether contextual cues — namely emphasizing 
U.S. political partisanship or a public health issue, COVID-19 — influenced how these three facets differentially relate 
to naïve realism. We believed priming COVID-19 would reduce relativism across the board while priming U.S. 
political partisanship would increase it. However, this prime did not moderate the relationships between moral, 
epistemic, and situational relativism and naïve realism. Thus, because we found that there was no difference in how 
participants responded across the two conditions, we collapsed these two conditions and do not explore this further in 
the present study. 
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study that sought to 1) create and validate an instrument of moral, epistemic, and situational 
relativism and 2) determine whether it predicts naïve realism in disagreement contexts. Finally, 
we will discuss additional considerations for future research, limitations, and broader impacts of 
the proposed work. 
1.1 When Naïve Realism Thrives and Divides  
All experience, even physical reality, is constructed and inherently subjective, yet people 
believe that their experience of reality is correct in all contexts (i.e., Gilovich & Ross, 2016). 
People can build an imperfect, yet reliable, consensus about what the physical world looks, smells, 
sounds, feels, and even tastes like (barring sensory impairments). However, building a collective 
consensus around how the social world – composed of complex everyday social and political 
issues and perspectives – is much more challenging to do. This is because our interpretations about 
the social world are largely socially constructed with others in our immediate environments 
(Gilovich & Ross, 2016; Schwalbe et al., 2020; Sherif, 1935; Shibutani, 2017; Van Kleef et al., 
2019).   
This difficulty in escaping our own perspective when it comes to social and political 
opinions contributes to our conviction that our own perceptions (including our priorities, beliefs, 
and preferences) are objective and rational. Further, because perceptions of the world are objective 
to the eye of the beholder, people tend to believe that others who share their rationality must also 
hold similar perceptions to our own. Disagreements can thus contribute to an “us versus them” 
mentality at the interpersonal and group levels, which has the potential to sow division, distrust, 
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and conflict between those with opposing viewpoints (Ehrlinger et al., 2005; Schwalbe et al., 2020; 
Westwood et al., 2018).  
Needless to say, this lack of confidence and trust in people with opposing viewpoints is 
well-documented in many aspects of everyday life in the U.S., both in-person and online (Pew 
Research Center, 2014). People actively avoid discussing their social and political viewpoints with 
family members (Chen & Rohla, 2018; Sutherland, 2018), relocate to areas where others are 
ideologically similar (Motyl et al., 2014), and perpetuate cycles of enmity and intolerance for 
opposing viewpoints on social media (Pew Research Center, 2014; Yang et al., 2017). Often, this 
lack of confidence that feeds into nonconstructive interactions creates further divisions that 
reinforce an unwillingness to work together toward a common goal. In fact, they often perpetuate 
increased social and political polarization, which subsequently feeds back into distrusting those 
with opposing views, creating a vicious cycle (Pew Research Center, 2014; Rossini, 2020, 
Sunstein; 2018). 
1.2 Proposing Relativism as a Predictor of Naïve Realism  
Previous research has explored how people’s moral convictions, ability to process 
evidentiary information despite group identity, and beliefs in the potential inaccuracy of their 
knowledge all influence their viewpoints on complex issues (i.e., moral convictions, self-integrity 
vis-à-vis self-affirmation, intellectual humility; Binning et al., 2015; Krumrei-Mancuso & Rouse, 
2016; Porter & Schumann, 2018; Skitka et al., 2005). Moral and epistemic relativism were 
theoretically popularized in philosophy beginning in the 19th century. However, very little research 
has sought to identify, validate, and empirically distinguish moral and epistemic relativism, let 
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alone an additional facet we propose — situational relativism — as measurable drivers of naïve 
realism. The logic of relativism follows that people ought not to be judged for differences in 
opinion because the locus of control is not dispositional, but rather, due to the external context that 
informs what is virtuous and good. We thus propose that acknowledging the moral, epistemic, and 
situational validity in differing beliefs predicts fewer hostile judgements of those with opposing 
views, especially for topics that may not have a cut and dry answer.  
There are some aspects of reality that, for the most part, are agreed upon universals — for 
instance, that gravity exists and that water is wet — that the present research thus circumvents. 
However, many issues and ideas in today’s contemporary society are not as objective. For 
example, disagreements on societal issues can stem from how much security versus freedom a 
society ought to implement, how much non-governmental actors and groups with power ought to 
have government oversight, and how much involvement, if any, should be exercised in direct 
response to international conflicts, to name a few (Farrell & Newman, 2019; Pew Research Center, 
2016, 2019b). For these issues and others like them, people may hold viewpoints that emphasize 
and prioritize different aspects of the same issue, yielding differences in opinion. As such, the 
ways in which these different aspects may feel crucial – and more importantly, objective to 
individual people – can differ from person to person. It is these instances, where people feel their 
own viewpoints are akin to the fact that gravity exists or that water is wet, that create the conditions 
under which naïve realism thrives and divides. We argue that especially in these instances — 
wherein an inherently subjective viewpoint feels to its perceiver to be an objective truth — that 
interactions and dialogues between people who disagree on a social or political issue may benefit 
from relativistic thinking in that interaction. There may be something about viewing the world in 
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relativistic terms that may alleviate the often-automatic tendencies to judge those with differing 
opinions harshly due to naïve realism.  
While much social psychological research has explored the psychological processes and 
downstream consequences that follow a disagreement (e.g., Gilovich & Ross, 2016; Griffin & 
Ross, 1991; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Robinson et al., 1995; Ross & Ward, 1996; Ross et al., 1977; 
Schwalbe et al., 2020; Ward et al., 1997), other fields like philosophy and cultural anthropology 
have theoretically explored reasons for why thoughts and beliefs are seen as being relative to 
experience (e.g., Boas, 1982; Geertz, 1993; Herskovitz, 1955; Hollis & Lukes, 1982; Nussbaum, 
1997; Wilson, 1970). Further, some of this work has explored how these thoughts and beliefs may 
be relative to a particular standpoint (i.e., specific contexts, culture), and thus may constitute 
greater tolerance of ideas and beliefs that deviate from one’s own. Thus, if relativism is said to 
increase tolerance for viewpoints deviating from one’s own, then logic follows that it may also 
relate to less naïve realism in disagreements.  
1.2.1 Moral Relativism  
Although there are various forms of relativism, perhaps the most popular is moral 
relativism. Moral relativism posits that moral judgments are relative to a particular reference point, 
such as cultural moral norms for what constitutes right and wrong (Corradetti, 2009; Hollis & 
Lukes, 1982; Gowans, 2012; Kellenberger, 2010; Lukes, 2008; Nussbaum, 1997; Wilson, 1970). 
Further, it suggests that these reference points depend on contextual factors (e.g., believing what 
is morally bad in one context, like stealing, is morally good in another context – such as if stealing 
serves the purpose of preventing oneself and one’s loved ones from going hungry). Moral 
relativism thus surmises that contexts, cultures, and groups are diverse (Boas, 1982; Geertz, 1993; 
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Herskovits, 1955), and thus viewpoints within a given context are no better, morally speaking, 
than other viewpoints outside of that context, culture, or group.  
Although critics of moral relativism say it is untenable due to its boundary conditions and 
potential to justify immoral and even heinous acts (Rachels, 2009; Rai & Holyoak, 2013; Young 
& Durwin, 2013), its proponents posit that there are instances where relativism is tenable and serve 
as a way to promote and increase tolerance (Corradetti, 2009; Feyerabend, 1978; Haidt, 2007; 
Harman, 1975; MacIntyre, 2013; Rai & Fiske, 2011). Thus, although we focus this paper on the 
potential benefits of relativism in reducing naïve realism, we also caution that there may be a dark 
side to relativism, which we discuss further when considering topical domains and boundary 
conditions of relativism, and when it may be more socially constructive to be absolutist.  
Even though moral judgments may be made in contexts with a clear moral answer, it may 
especially thrive in instances of moral ambiguity. Perhaps the most popular example of how our 
moral priorities yield differing beliefs or actions is in the trolley problem – a thought experiment 
wherein there is a runaway trolley headed down railway tracks (Figure 1; Hacker-Wright, 2019). 
On the main track there are five people who are tied to the track and are thus unable to move, and 
the person in the thought experiment is said to be off to the side by a lever that, if pulled, will 
switch the train to another set of tracks. However, on this second set of tracks, there is one person 
who is also tied to the tracks and is unable to move. The dilemma then becomes whether it is more 
ethical to do nothing and let five people die on the main track, or to pull the lever and divert the 
trolley onto the second track to save five people, but kill the one person on the side track in the 
process.  
The trolley problem has been previously described as pitting two schools of moral thought 
against the other – utilitarianism versus deontology (Greene et al., 2001); however, it also stands 
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to reason that people’s differing moral priorities will yield disagreements with others who value a 
different moral school of thought (or its elements) over the other. Thus, moral relativism (versus 
absolutism) can provide tolerance of those with differing moral views – and ultimately contribute 
to mitigating naive realism.  
1.2.2 Epistemic Relativism  
Similarly, epistemic relativism is the idea that knowledge is relative to a particular 
reference point, such as a culture or social context, and that this dictates what is factually right or 
wrong (Boghossian 2006; Carter, 2019; Goldman, 2010; Williams, 2007). It should be noted that 
there are varying degrees through which epistemic relativism is debated to operate. At one extreme, 
facts and values are interchangeable and all judgments, including factual judgments, are subject to 
relativistic thinking (Carter, 2019; Yalcin, 2011). At the other extreme, epistemic relativism 
becomes epistemic nihilism, wherein people deny that facts and knowledge are inherently false 
and unattainable. Further, those who believe that facts and knowledge are not real may further 
believe that only they know what is true. This is known as gnosticism — the belief that knowledge 
is based on personal experience or perception. In this way, people perceive their own knowledge 
as fundamentally correct in all circumstances, even in the face of evidence to the contrary (Moore, 
n.d.). Taken together, the first extreme that all matters of life are subject to relativistic thinking, 
including those based on factual evidence, likely leads to less naïve realism in contexts of 
disagreement; the second extreme, believing that only one knows the truth in all contexts, likely 
leads to greater naïve realism.  
In between these extremes is a middle ground wherein we situate the present work. The 
moderate position on epistemic relativism is that there is an important distinction between factual 
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and value judgments — where factual judgments are provable and objective and value judgments 
only pertain to inherently subjective beliefs and values that have no inherently correct answer 
(Boghossian, 2001; Carter, 2016; Seidel, 2014). Thus, we argue that epistemic relativism is most 
useful and socially constructive when it operates in this middle ground (as opposed to either 
extremes presented above), and when it is within the context of value (as opposed to factual) 
judgments. Further, we argue that the moderate approach, wherein people are relativistic about 
topics that are nuanced and subject to value (as opposed to factual) judgments, is ultimately related 
to less naïve realism.  
We illustrate this in Figure 2 where people may view the same object yet interpret it in 
different ways. When extended to the social and political world we inhabit, differing aspects of 
the same experience or topic may become present and inherent, where epistemically the “right” 
answer of a situation may depend on what stands out in a situation and how contexts have shaped 
our previous knowledge. When it comes to naïve realism, those who hold differing viewpoints 
may be seen negatively, but we posit that epistemic relativism (in the moderate sense) tempers this 
tendency.  
1.2.3 Situational Relativism  
Finally, both moral and epistemic relativism depend largely on a given situational vantage 
point. We define situational relativism as the ways in which people take a given situation or 
context into account when making judgments of people based on their views and actions, 
especially when these views and actions differ from one’s own.  The importance of contexts and 
situations when judging and attributing beliefs and behaviors is a staple of social psychology. 
While people tend to assume the worst of those who act differently from themselves (i.e., the 
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fundamental attribution error, also see correspondence bias; Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Harman, 
1999; Jones & Davis, 1965; Jones & Harris, 1967; Ross, 1977), people are dually capable of 
making situational attributions for themselves and members of their ingroups, often giving them 
“the benefit of the doubt.”  
Thus, we posit that if people can look to situations and contexts as a contributor of behavior 
and thoughts, then it follows that contexts may shape value judgments in instances where people 
disagree with each other as well. For instance, the same symbol can be interpreted in different 
ways depending on what is visually attended to in an image (Figure 3). The middle character of 
the image could be interpreted as a “B” when read horizontally, but as a “13” when read vertically. 
Despite the image itself being static, our interpretation of the middle character is influenced by 
what we attend to in the context of the image itself.  
Although it is easier to alternate between both visual interpretations, this becomes harder 
to do when replacing the visual with subjective interpretation of complex issues. Despite living in 
a world where (dis)agreement is often not about visual images but rather about complex 
sociopolitical issues, the influence of situations on people’s lived experiences and social contexts 
may have just as much, if not more, of an influence on whether their viewpoints are, in essence, a 
“B,” a “13,” or another interpretation entirely. Situations, such as upbringing and neighborhood 
contexts – and the social norms they provide – can influence how people view the world (Fiske et 
al., 1998; Markus & Kitayama, 2003; Ross, 1977). Further, taking the unique situations and 
contexts of those with opposing views into account can be related to less negative assumptions of 
those who think differently in their beliefs or views. 
We posit that these multiple ways of viewing the world morally, epistemically, and 
situationally, although not exhaustive, relate to naïve realism and reactions to disagreement by 
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influencing assumptions of others’ (im)morality, (un)informedness, and (ir)rationality in a holistic 
manner. Given that disagreements in our society often lead to destructive standstills and even 
active harm (Abramowitz & McCoy, 2019; Abrams, 2019; Knowles & Tropp, 2018; Pew Research 
Center, 2014; Rauch, 2016; Schwartz, 2020), reducing hostility and immediate assumptions that 
others who disagree are immoral, uninformed, and or irrational may require people to see the 
differing person in a relativistic way – morally, epistemically, and situationally. 
1.3 The Present Study 
This study has two aims and seeks to measure and evaluate how each type of relativism 
most effectively reduces naïve realism. First, it aims to develop and validate an instrument of 
relativism and its theorized distinguishable components – moral, epistemic, and situational. 
Second, it will explore how moral, epistemic, and situational relativism each distinctly relate to 
naïve realism as defined by reactions to disagreement with others on apolitical (i.e., audiovisual 
stimuli), taboo, moral, and political issues and operationalized holistically. This study therefore 
seeks to address the following research questions:  
RQ1: Are moral, epistemic, and situational relativism distinguishable, valid, and 
reliable constructs? 
RQ2: How do moral, epistemic, and situational relativism distinctly predict naïve 
realism, as defined by disagreements on apolitical, taboo, moral, and political topics?  
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Hypotheses3  
H1: Moral, epistemic, and situational relativism will be valid, reliable, and related 
yet distinguishable facets of our overall construct of relativism.  
H2: Moral, epistemic, and situational relativism will each distinctly predict naïve 
realism. Higher moral, epistemic, and situational relativism will each uniquely reduce 
naïve realism and hostility towards people with opposing views.  
 
3 These hypotheses were preregistered on Open Science Framework and can be found at osf.io/vfp8j 




Three-hundred and thirty-seven U.S. participants were recruited from Prolific, an online 
survey platform, in late March of 2020. Thirteen participants were excluded from data analysis 
due to incomplete data, missing an attention check question, and/or if they indicated they had 
issues with our survey. The remaining 324 participants (51% womxn, 48% men, 1% non-binary) 
were between 18 to 76 years of age (M age = 36.25, SD =13.53). The sample identified as 
predominantly White (80%), followed by Asian or Asian American (8%), Latinx/a/o/e (6%), Black 
or African American (3%), and Native American (3%). Political self-identification was reported 
on a 7-point scale anchored by extremely liberal to extremely conservative. The sample identified 
as 14% extremely liberal, 21% very liberal, 14% somewhat liberal, 7% neither liberal nor 
conservative, 22% somewhat conservative, 15% very conservative, and 7% extremely 
conservative. Participants also indicated they were Democrats (48%), Republicans (45%), or 
Independents (4%).  
2.2 Procedure 
Participants were asked to complete a survey on mindsets and social life. Participants first 
encountered a blurb about the study on the Prolific platform, along with the average compensation 
amount. If they chose to participate, participants then were taken to a consent page with 
16 
information on the study, a statement on the confidential and voluntary nature of the study, and 
the researchers’ contact information. After consenting to the study, participants were presented 
with counterbalanced blocks of items aiming to measure moral, epistemic, and situational 
relativism. Blocks were counterbalanced evenly to ensure the ordering of the items did not 
influence responses on subsequent items. Following this, participants were asked for their personal 
beliefs and reactions to disagreement on various apolitical, taboo, moral, and political issues. These 
were randomized within-subjects to decrease order effects. After these questions, participants were 
asked to complete additional questions to assess need for closure, intellectual humility, and 
perspective-taking (further detailed below) in order to assess discriminant validity of our proposed 
relativism instrument. At the end of the survey, we asked demographic and attention check 
questions.  
2.2.1 Need for Closure (NFC) 
Given time constraints, NFC was assessed using the abridged 15-item Need for Closure 
Scale (NFCS-revised; Roets & Van Hiel, 2011). While this abridged version is not as 
comprehensive as the original Webster and Kruglanski (1994) 42-item NFC scale, both the NFCS-
revised and the original NFC have comparable psychometric properties that suggest the NFCS-
revised is an empirically valid version. Items (i.e., I feel irritated when one person disagrees with 
what everyone else in a group believes) were rated on a 7-point scale (1= strongly disagree to 7= 
strongly agree) and were averaged to create a NFC composite after reverse-coding negatively 
worded items. Higher scores indicate higher need for closure (α = .73; M = 3.26, SD = .81).  
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2.2.2 Intellectual Humility (IH) 
IH was assessed using the 9-item instrument developed by Porter and Schumann (2018). 
Items (i.e., I am willing to admit it if I don’t know something) were rated on a 7-point scale (1= 
strongly disagree to 7= strongly agree) and were averaged to create an IH composite after reverse-
coding negatively worded items. Higher scores indicate higher intellectual humility (α = .76; M = 
5.13, SD = .79).  
2.2.3 Perspective Taking (PT) 
PT was assessed using the 7 perspective-taking items from the Interpersonal Reactivity 
Index (Davis, 1983). Items (i.e., I sometimes find it difficult to see things from another person's 
point of view) were rated on a 7-point scale (1= strongly disagree to 7= strongly agree) and were 
averaged to create an IH composite after reverse-coding negatively worded items. Higher scores 
indicate higher perspective taking (α = .84; M = 5.06, SD = .97).  
2.3 Predictor Variables 
2.3.1 Moral, Epistemic, and Situational Relativism 
This work constitutes the third study in the scale development process; two previous studies 
had been conducted prior to the present research primarily providing support for epistemic 
relativism on an older version of a Relativist-Absolutist Mindset (RAM) scale. The present study 
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expands on previous work by not only expanding and refining scale items to measure epistemic 
RAM, but further differentiating between two additional elements of relativism: moral and 
situational RAM (i.e., RAM-M and RAM-S, respectively). As such, 38 original items were 
developed for this study to capture moral, epistemic, and situational relativism. These updated 
items consisted of 12 moral relativism items (RAM-M; i.e., There is often more than one ethical 
viewpoint that is valid in a given situation), 14 epistemic relativism items (RAM-E; i.e., It is 
justified for multiple people to have differing viewpoints on the same topic), and 14 situational 
relativism items (RAM-S; i.e., It is important to understand differing viewpoints by appreciating 
the ways people's ways of life differ). We created these updated RAM items based on considerable 
literature review and reflecting on whether the items had good face and content validity. These 38 
items were anchored on a 7-point scale (1= strongly disagree to 7= strongly agree) and were 
inclusive of negatively and positively worded phrases. Higher RAM scores indicate higher 
relativism (lower absolutism), while lower scores indicate lower relativism (higher absolutism).  
2.3.1.1 Assessing Content and Discriminant Validity  
These items were assessed for content validity by examining the philosophy literature to 
ensure we included the central aspects for each type of relativism in our instrument items. The 
literature suggested that relativism could be largely broken down by moral and epistemic 
relativism – and that underlying both, yet also possibly distinct, was a dimension of situational 
relativism. Thus, items were created specific to these three proposed dimensions of RAM.  
To determine the extent to which the RAM items were distinct from other related 
theoretical concepts, we checked correlations of the RAM subscales with other theoretically and 
conceptually-related instruments (i.e., Need for Closure, Intellectual Humility, Perspective 
Taking) to ensure they were not overwhelmingly correlated (i.e., all correlations r ≥ 0.5). In other 
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words, correlations that are lower than 0.5 suggest that the construct is distinguishable from other 
established and related constructs in psychology.4 Further, temporal stability of all potentially 
related constructs was held constant by measuring them within the same study. Discriminant 
validity correlations from various existing instrument are contained within Table 1.  
2.3.2 Naïve Realism 
Naïve realism was operationalized as participants’ holistic reactions to disagreement with 
a hypothetical person who held opposing views, an operationalization we developed in previous 
iterations of research. First, participants were asked to evaluate a series of apolitical, taboo, moral, 
and political topics – ranging from audiovisual stimuli, views on the existence of a higher being, 
deontological versus utilitarian moral dilemmas, and views on climate change, to name a few. 
Each block consisted of three different apolitical, taboo, moral, political examples, respectively. 
Participants were asked to indicate their views on each of these examples and the extent to which 
they could understand the opposing viewpoint. Using this information, the survey was set up to 
then ask participants to imagine a hypothetical person who disagreed with them (using the opposite 
 
4 In addition to examining correlations, we ran exploratory regression models to explore whether RAM-M, 
RAM-E, and RAM-S predicted Naïve Realism above and beyond Need for Closure, Intellectual Humility, and 
Perspective Taking (as well as Political Ideology). These findings suggested that the three RAM subscales 
significantly and uniquely predict Naïve Realism even after including Need for Closure, Intellectual Humility, 
Perspective Taking, and Political Ideology in the model. Given that the model held above and beyond Need for 
Closure, Intellectual Humility, Perspective Taking, and Political Ideology, as shown in Table 5, this provided further 
confidence that RAM-M, RAM-E, and RAM-S uniquely predict Naïve Realism.  
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response to the one they had indicated to be their own viewpoint). Further, we asked participants 
to rate the extent they perceived the opposing person to be 1) irrational, 2) uninformed, and 3) 
immoral for their differing viewpoints on each of the twelve topics. Responses were anchored by 
extremely [irrational/uninformed/immoral] (1) to extremely [rational/informed/moral] (7). Prior 
to analyses, participants’ raw ratings of the hypothetical opposing person were reverse-coded to 
instead have higher scores reflect higher naïve realism. These ratings were averaged within each 
of the four topics to create four naïve realism subcomposites, collapsing across their ratings of the 
hypothetical opposing person’s (ir)rationality, (un)informedness, and (im)morality, to reflect 
apolitical (α = .87), taboo (α = .77), moral (α = .90), and political (a=.84) naïve realism. These 
subcomposites were later used as indicator variables to represent the latent variable of naïve 
realism (to answer RQ2). We also created a larger naïve realism composite encompassing all of 
these four topics (α = .91). 
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3.0 Results 
3.1 Data Analytic Strategy 
To address RQ1, “Are moral, epistemic, and situational relativism distinguishable, valid, 
and reliable constructs?” we conducted item response theory (IRT) analysis. The IRT analysis 
allowed us to test the RAM instrument’s basic psychometric properties – namely each item’s 
difficulty (bi ; i.e., how well participant ability levels are captured by each item) and item 
discrimination (ai ; i.e., how well choosing different response options on each item captures these 
varying difficulty levels for each participant). This allowed us to understand which items 
sufficiently distinguished between people with low, moderate, and high relativism across the three 
subscales (i.e., moral, epistemic, and situational). Ultimately, the goal for the IRT analyses in the 
present work was to pick the top six items per subset to comprise the new RAM instrument, made 
up of moral, epistemic, and situational items. 
To answer RQ2, “How do moral, epistemic, and situational relativism distinctly predict 
naïve realism as defined by disagreements on apolitical, taboo, moral, and political topics?” 
maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard errors in EQS (Version 6; Bentler, 2007) was 
used to estimate the main hypothesized latent measurement model. Additionally, we tested all 
possible permutations of mediation and moderation models examining the associations of each 
subscale (i.e., RAM-M, RAM-E, RAM-S) with naïve realism. 
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3.2 RAM Scale Development and Validation 
3.2.1 Assessing Psychometric Properties 
All item parameters are displayed in Table 2. Items were first fit to a 2-parameter logistic 
(2PL) model using R to assess both item difficulty (bi) and item discriminability (ai). We then 
plotted item characteristic curves (ICCs; Figures 4-43).  Finally, we tested the fit of the 2PL model 
and estimated ability scores to determine convergent validity of the RAM instrument. Six items 
from each of the moral, epistemic, and situational RAM subsets exhibited a reasonable span across 
the trait range (as suggested by item difficulty parameters) and sufficient discrimination 
parameters. On the other hand, items were dropped if they had low discriminability (e.g., ≤ 0.5) 
and the distributions for each item’s difficulty parameters were excessively unevenly distributed 
and/or skewed. As an additional check, these six items for each of the RAM-M, RAM-E, and 
RAM-S subscales and eighteen items total were subjected to an exploratory factor analysis to 
examine the overall factor structure of the eighteen RAM items. More information on the factor 
loadings for each item from this EFA is in Table 3.5 
Finally, we assessed reliability for each of the moral, epistemic, and situational RAM 
subscales and the entire eighteen-item composite. Cronbach alphas for the overall RAM instrument 
and broken down by subscale are all above 0.80, which suggests they all have good internal 
 
5 For this EFA, the factors were allowed to correlate since they are theorized to be related to the more latent 
construct of relativism. The scale fit a three-dimensional model with factor loadings of at least 0.55, except for one 
item in the RAM-E subscale with a value of 0.53.  
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consistency. Examining the correlations between subscales did not suggest any multicollinearity 
issues. All reliability, means, and inter-correlations are listed in Table 1. Based on this and as 
suggested in the following section, the reliability and validity of the scale was deemed strong 
enough to be a predictive instrument of the three proposed facets of relativism that are they distinct, 
measurable, and related to one another, supporting H1. 
3.3 Testing Moral, Epistemic, and Situational Relativism Predicting Naïve Realism 
3.3.1 Model Fit 
Robust methods were used to buffer against nonnormal distribution of the data, given that 
often data in psychology are hard to specify (Bentler, 1995). CFI values greater than .90 was used 
as the cutoff to reflect acceptable fit. SRMR and RMSEA values lower than .08 indicate good fit 
and were used as well (Hu & Bentler, 1999; Kline, 2015; Marsh et al., 2004). Even though chi-
square tests and degrees of freedom are sensitive to sample size, the Satorra-Bentler (SB) chi-
square value was also used. In all estimated latent models, satisfactory fit was determined when 
all of the fit indices were in the ranges presented above. The hypothesized model was tested using 
post hoc modification indices to ascertain which paths the data suggest are not necessary and which 
omitted paths the data indicate ought to be included. Thus, a Lagrange multiplier (LM) test to add 
parameters and a Wald test for dropping parameters were requested from EQS in the data output. 
Fit indices for our hypothesized model are presented in Table 4.  
This model included paths from each of the relativism factors (moral, epistemic, and 
situational relativism) to naïve realism (represented as one latent variable that contained four 
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observed variables: the composites of reactions to disagreement on apolitical, taboo, moral, and 
political topics). Estimates for factor correlation between relativism and naïve realism were 
included. This model also covaried the relativism factors to account for the associations between 
them. Within each of the latent variables to represent moral, epistemic, and situational relativism, 
our observed variables comprising RAM-M, RAM-E, and RAM-S were partially disaggregated. 
In other words, each latent variable was composed of three 2-item composites to represent our 
observed variables. Furthermore, the first composite for each of the three factors had its variance 
set to 1. This main model produced a significant SB chi-square value, SB χ2 (59) = 112.11, p < 
.001 but alternate indices suggested acceptable fit: CFI = .96, RMSEA = .05 (90% CI = .04, .07), 
average absolute standardized residual = .03 (largest residuals = .21, -.11, .11).  
As alluded to earlier, LM and Wald tests were used to ascertain if and where the model 
was misspecified. The LM test helps determine whether an unspecified path from one factor to 
another would improve model fit. The LM test in this instance suggested that an indicator variable 
we hypothesized belonged in the RAM-S latent factor might fit better as an indicator variable in 
the RAM-E latent factor, χ2 change = 3.26, p = .001. However, given the strong correlation 
between the RAM-E and RAM-S factors (r=.58) and our a priori theorized and hypothesized latent 
factors being supported by IRT analyses, we decided to retain our hypothesized model. On the 
other hand, the Wald test did not suggest we should drop any parameters.  
3.3.2 Analyses of Path Estimates 
The observed estimates of the model are illustrated in Figure 44. The estimates are 
significant at the conventional p < .05 level. First, all factors of relativism — moral, epistemic, and 
situational—were significantly related to each other as expected given previous EFA and IRT 
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analyses.  Also as expected, moral, epistemic, and situational relativism all differentially predicted 
naïve realism. These three factors collectively explained 22% of the variance in naïve realism. 
Epistemic relativism was the strongest predictor of naïve realism (B = -.45), t = -3.29, p < .05, 
followed by situational relativism (B = .32), t = 2.02, p < .05, and moral relativism (B = -.31), t = 
-2.50, p < .05.  
In summary, stronger beliefs that it is justified to have varying knowledge beliefs on the 
same topic was related to less negative judgments of others in contexts of disagreement. Similarly, 
stronger personal beliefs that morality is relative was related to less negative judgments of others 
who disagree with oneself. Surprisingly, however, stronger beliefs that viewpoints are shaped by 
the ways people’s ways of life differ was related to more negative judgments of others in contexts 
of disagreement. Although this finding was not hypothesized from the outset, further reflection on 
why epistemic and moral relativism predicted less harsh reactions to disagreement but situational 
relativism predicted harsher reactions to disagreement is further discussed below. Thus, H2 was 
partially supported. 
3.3.3 Testing Alternative Models 
Alternative models were tested using maximum likelihood to ascertain that the chosen 
model above had the best fit, relative to less parsimonious models in which there are one 
exogenous and two mediator predictors (for all three possible permutations of this) or two 
exogenous and one mediator predictors (again, for all three possible permutations of this). These 
six alternative models (Figures 45-50) were assessed and had varying degrees of freedom, with 
some (but not all) fitting the data sufficiently. In the three models that had two mediators being 
predicted by one exogenous predictor, the mediators’ errors were covaried. The fit indices 
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presented in Table 4 suggested that none of the alternative models were a better fit to the data than 
the hypothesized model (and thus did not seem to suggest a mediational story either), especially 
given that our chosen model is the most parsimonious and fits well.  
Given that EQS does not have features to test for interactions with latent variables (Bentler, 
1995), we tested for interactions between moral, epistemic, and situational relativism using our 
non-latent variables in multiple regression. We saw no hints of interactions between our three 
relativism constructs (Table 6).  Thus, our exploration of alternative models increases confidence 
that the three facets of relativism each predict naïve realism exogenously, directly, and distinctly.  
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4.0 Discussion 
The current U.S. political landscape motivated much of the current work in further 
understanding methods to reduce naïve realism. Many in the U.S., especially political partisans, 
disagree on a range of issues that have remarkably become polarized over the last few decades – 
from gun policies, to rights for womxn, the LGBTQIA+ community, immigrants, Black, 
Indigenous, and People of Color, and even to mask-wearing during the ongoing COVID-19 
pandemic. Given the importance of further understanding disagreement across a broad range of 
topics and potential ways to mitigate hostility due to differences in viewpoints, the present study 
examined how a novel measure of relativism related to naïve realism and tendencies to judge others 
harshly. Understanding this link can prove important for creating future socially responsible 
behavioral interventions to target conflicts exacerbated by disagreement. 
The present study found that moral, epistemic, and situational relativism, comprising the 
larger construct of relativism in which this work is largely embedded, appears to be a distinct, 
valid, and reliable construct as operationalized by our 18-item RAM instrument. These findings 
suggest that people are mindful that differing moral, epistemic, and situational vantage points can 
yield differences in opinions and views, and that these elements of relativism are further associated 
with one another. Additionally, moral and epistemic relativism, operationalized by the validated 
RAM instrument, were related to less naïve realism—operationalized holistically by harsh 
reactions to disagreement across a range of topics. Rather surprisingly, situational relativism was 
related to higher naïve realism.  
Our findings that moral and epistemic relativism were related to less harsh reactions to 
disagreement support the current philosophical literature. Moral relativism has been theorized to 
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increase tolerance in situations where someone disagrees with the moral actions of an actor – yet 
does not feel compelled to intervene, especially if the actor appeared to be well-informed and 
rational when behaving in that way (Wong, 1984). Further, epistemic relativism assumes that there 
are multiple valid knowledge systems based on differing contexts, and that these can be 
incompatible yet equally valid (Boghossian 2006; Carter, 2019; Williams, 2007). Thus, these ideas 
that the actions or beliefs of those with whom we disagree can be justified given differing, yet 
valid systems of moral and epistemic frameworks support our findings in the present work. Higher 
moral and epistemic relativism as we have conceptualized it appears to promote tolerance and the 
idea that the world is not black and white, but rather, different shades of gray – and thus judgments 
of those with differing views need not be chastised.  
However, our findings also suggest that when the situations or contexts themselves from 
which one’s beliefs stem become salient, these same situations highlight the situational differences 
in which people have developed, revised, and reinforced their views. While the philosophical 
literature does not make many assumptions about relativism solely from the vantage point of social 
contexts or situations, cultural anthropological work posits about cultural relativism that differing 
views and actions are valid given the existence of differing about cultures and norms within these 
contexts (Boas, 1982; Geertz, 1993; Herskovits, 1955). Given the unexpected nature of this 
finding, we explore it further in the section below.  
4.1 The Paradox of Situations and Situational Relativism  
Despite originally theorizing that all three facets of relativism – moral, epistemic, and 
situational – would be related to lower naïve realism, situational relativism itself may emphasize 
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a vantage point from which people become more judgmental of opposing viewpoints. This was a 
surprising finding given work emphasizing that contextualizing people’s behavior can reduce 
negative dispositional attributions (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Harman, 1999; Jones & Davis, 1965; 
Jones & Harris, 1967; Ross, 1977). While additional research is in order to ensure this finding is 
not spurious, the present work suggests that acknowledging the social contexts in which people’s 
views are rooted can be destructive in contexts of disagreement wherein people’s value judgments 
are involved. While this certainly warrants further exploration, it also suggests an important 
implication on the nature of situational relativism: Emphasizing differences between people’s 
opposing views vis-à-vis their situational contexts may further emphasize the ways in which 
people’s contextual and situational realities – albeit subjective, fluid, and malleable on a minute-
by-minute basis – can also become intractably static and different from others’ situations in the 
long-term. Despite the flexibility of situations and contexts, being mindful of the influence of other 
people’s upbringing and cultures in disagreements may actually highlight the ways people are 
different. In other words, differing backgrounds and contexts may paradoxically be seen as 
immutably different features of people.  
Future research should further investigate whether emphasizing different “cultural values” 
and situations is not be a useful method to reducing naïve realism. Additionally, future research 
should explore whether less harsh judgments requires people to 1) share similar backgrounds or 
cultures to reduce negative judgments of others in everyday disagreements, or 2) have a 
willingness to look past differences in people’s situational and cultural backgrounds more broadly 
when disagreeing. Future interventions should consider the potentially destructive effect of 
situational relativism when creating applications to reduce conflicts involving value judgments.  
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4.2 Additional Theoretical Considerations 
The present research begs the question, “can relativism always promote good?” Although 
we situated the present work within the intellectual framework of using relativism as a tool for 
mitigating naïve realism, we also cautioned earlier about the potential dark side to relativism. 
Although we did not consider this empirically in the present work, we can ascertain confidently 
that relativism does break down when principles of justice are not foundational and agreed on by 
all within a given society (Rawls, 1971). In other words, treating people with dignity and respect 
is one of the basic preconditions of a just society. When these preconditions are not in place or are 
themselves the subject of disagreements, then relativism can reinforce harmful systems that go 
against these principles. Thus, we discuss boundary conditions, topical domains, and other 
theoretical and contextual factors that inform when and how relativism may either be beneficial or 
detrimental to constructive social progress. 
4.2.1 Considering Boundary Conditions and Topical Domains of Relativism in Context  
While our findings suggested that at least two facets of relativism – moral and epistemic – 
were associated with less harsh judgments of disagreeing others, an important consideration is that 
relativism may inadvertently become problematic in our increasingly polarized and 
(mis)(dis)information-ridden society (Lapowsky, 2018; Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence, 2017; Toropin et al., 2020). Given fake news’ stronghold in the U.S. (Grieco, 2017), 
its ability to intensify social conflict (Zeitzoff, 2017), undermine faith in the democratic process 
(Dale, 2020), deter constructive dialogue (Bennett & Livingston, 2018; Toropin et al., 2020), and 
reduce social cooperation (Frenkel et al., 2020; Mezzofiore et al., 2020), the question then becomes 
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not how to use relativism to promote people being able to see eye-to-eye but when and why to use 
relativism. While there are many reasons in today’s polarized society to consider this, one is that 
of malevolent actors who intend to deceive the general public and have more access now than ever 
before to spread disinformation quickly and readily. Conspiracy theories have been levied at 
astonishingly dangerous rates in recent history, including among our own government’s leadership 
(see QAnon conspiracy theory, disinformation about COVID-19 – to name a couple; Buckley, 
2015; Dale, 2020; Keith, 2020; Lewis, 2020; Stolberg & Weiland; Wood et al., 2012).  
The threat of fake news to sow conflict and further entrench people in their own views has 
critical implications for how we trust others and have dialogues about sociopolitical issues that 
affect us all and often spark disagreements. Our constructions of reality have always been 
inherently subjective and thus subject to faults. However, it is increasingly difficult to construct a 
reliable, albeit subjective, reality in a world where falsehoods are shared swiftly and merge with 
empirical and scientific fact – ultimately promoting a bankrupt and insidious view of reality 
capable of causing real harm to society. In this sense then, being relativistic about falsehoods 
promoted by malevolent actors intended to create conflict and discredit the democratic process, is 
not entirely helpful. Some topics and issues require people to live in a shared reality for oneself 
and the greater good, especially in contexts when the greater good is at risk.  
4.2.2 When Being Absolutist is Better for the Greater Good 
 This work’s underlying motivations were to understand, for the sake of social harmony, 
how people understand opposing viewpoints as being shaped by ways of knowing morally, 
epistemically, and situationally. One important factor is then critically thinking about what how 
relativism may inadvertently impede responsible and equitable social progress, especially in 
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relation to sociopolitical conflicts and disagreements. The following questions set up an important 
thought experiment in this regard: When two people are engaged in a disagreement about a 
sociopolitical issue in an ever-increasingly politicized society, is social progress illustrated by 
these people willingly engaging with each other in a civil way even if no one’s views are moved? 
Or is it illustrated by actual change in viewpoints? Further, does promoting uniformity in opinion 
across society constitute social change – or rather – is it being able to live in social harmony among 
diversity in thought that constitutes social progress? In considering this thought experiment, an 
important aspect of this work is considering what role relativism may play (and is capable of 
playing) in achieving any one of these goals, and more importantly, which of these goals is worth 
promoting for the greater good.  
Taking this a step further and as highlighted in the past year alone, there remains much 
inequity in the U.S. (CDC, 2020; NPR, 2020b; Saenz & Sparks, 2020; Schaeffer, 2020). When it 
comes to being relativistic, we must then be critical of the ways relativism can promote further 
harm rather than good. This becomes especially true when many disagreements concern matters 
of racism, sexism and misogyny, ableism, homophobia, transphobia, immigrant rights, and public 
health—to name a few. The 2020 U.S. Presidential Election alone says as much – when one side 
has attempted to sow doubt in the democratic process and has largely exhibited authoritarian 
tendencies in its rule (Dilanian & Memoli, 2020; Fandos & Cochrane, 2020; Shear, 2020), 
allowing the actions of these actors and refusing to speak up against them is in and of itself harmful. 
When it comes to protecting people or even the fabric of a dwindling democracy, it is not 
constructive to echo the sentiment that there are “very fine people on both sides.” Failing to speak 
up against the actions of those who have authority and power is what allows nefarious people and 
beliefs to succeed (Albright, 2018; Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018; Snyder, 2017). Ultimately, 
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recognizing different moral, epistemic and situational vantage points can create a danger of 
maintaining a harmful and oppressive status quo that actively hurts people and democratic systems 
through our collective actions and inactions.  
Given that our work aims to bridge societal conflicts constructively, considering “for whom 
are we bridging conflicts?” becomes a critical component of this work. If the answer to this 
question ultimately reinforces systems of disenfranchisement and oppression, then we must 
critically re-think our promotion of relativism in these instances. In other words, being absolutist 
(rather than relativist) about the importance of avoiding harm to others becomes critical in 
situations where people’s human rights are at stake and being debated.6   
4.3 Limitations and Future Directions 
While this research contributes to the existing literature by providing support for a novel 
theoretical construct of relativism and its relation to naïve realism, this work is not without 
limitations. First, although the RAM instrument’s content and empirical (i.e., discriminant, 
convergent, concurrent, and predictive) validity was good, the instrument itself could have been 
further improved if the items to measure moral, epistemic, and situational relativism had been 
additionally assessed by interdisciplinary experts (e.g., in philosophy) and by participants from the 
 
6 In some cases, there are parallels between relativism taken to the extreme and the adage, “qui tacet 
consentire videtur,” which means that those who are silent in times they could have spoken up are taken to agree. 
Although it is beyond the scope of the present research, further nuanced consideration of the specific contexts and 
conditions that may benefit from absolutism (over relativism) is in order.  
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general population for extra reassurance of the instrument’s face validity. Further, although IRT is 
considered a rigorous analysis for scale development and validation, further scale validation should 
be conducted iteratively with additional validity and psychometric checks over the span of a longer 
period of time to ensure that poorly functioning items are replaced with better items and validated. 
Second, this work was done with a predominantly WEIRD sample. Our findings could 
have been more generalizable if we had more Black, Indigenous, and People of Color participants 
within the U.S., given that most of the sample was White. Further, the data may only present a 
sliver of how relativism influences naïve realism in disagreement contexts. Individualism is 
emphasized heavily within the U.S. context, and thus independence and dispositions are highly 
valued. On the other hand, collectivism emphasizes interdependence and collectivistic cultural 
values (Nisbett et al., 2001; Varnum et al., 2010). Collectivists are also more likely to make 
situational (rather than dispositional) attributions when making judgments of others. Thus, we have 
yet to explore relativism within collectivistic contexts where situations are already placed at a 
higher importance. Future research should examine whether situational relativism similarly yields 
greater hostility towards those with opposing views, or whether situational relativism within 
collectivistic cultures in turn mitigates this hostility. Further, future research should explore how 
moral and epistemic relativism predict naïve realism within collectivistic cultures.  
Third, we operationalized naïve realism holistically as reactions to disagreement on 
apolitical, taboo, moral, and political topics. However, we did not distinguish between the different 
elements of our operationalization of naïve realism. There may be something key about what topics 
it is constructive to be relativistic about versus absolutist. Future research should thus break down 
these different facets of naïve realism as we have operationalized it and explore how relativism 
predicts naïve realism separately by apolitical, taboo, moral, and political topics. Additionally, 
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specifications should be made on how (in)consequential disagreements about certain topics are to 
further understand when it is more beneficial to be relativistic versus absolutist about specific 
categories of issues and the issues themselves. Further, it is imperative to explore whether there 
are instances where relativism no longer predicts naïve realism — with particular attention to 
contexts where there is little to no ambiguity about the moral, epistemic, or situational validity of 
people’s beliefs or actions.   
4.4 Conclusion 
Ultimately, we live in context within a society that requires cooperation, even while 
maintaining differing viewpoints. Despite people holding differing viewpoints, we must be able to 
coexist and cooperate constructively. Yet, we often make judgments about other people 
specifically because of their viewpoints. In fostering a cooperative and constructive society, we 
need to be able to use our differences and our disagreements as a tool to help us become better 
members of society. Disagreement should open the door to conversation and progress and not close 
it. Yet, the judgments we make that others are irrational, uninformed, immoral – and worse – often 
closes this door. We must then find ways to both open the door despite differences in opinion and 
keep it open for future conversations that are civil, societally constructive, and equitable. Only in 
this way can our dependence on each other, our livelihoods, our safety and well-being – for the 
sake of ourselves and our democracy – truly become unthreatening and achievable through our 
individual and collective efforts and commitment to a better world.  
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Appendix A Tables 
Table 1 Scale Reliabilities, Means, Standard Deviations, and Pearson Intercorrelation Matrix 
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Table 2 Item Response Theory Parameter Estimates for the RAM Scale 
Item a b1 b2 b3 
RAM-E1 0.80 -0.91 0.29 1.50 
RAM-E2 0.60 0.04 -0.08 1.90 
RAM-E3 1.74 -2.27 -0.76 0.43 
RAM-E4 0.15 -5.53 0.82 4.40 
RAM-E5 0.91 -2.33 0.37 1.41 
RAM-E6 1.21 -1.43 -0.45 1.09 
RAM-E7 1.26 -2.43 0.08 1.01 
RAM-E8 0.40 -0.15 -2.56 -1.17
RAM-E9 0.35 -0.75 2.64 3.03
RAM-E10 0.48 -1.52 0.70 3.04
RAM-E11 1.88 -1.88 -0.47 0.93
RAM-E12 0.52 -0.35 0.79 2.16
RAM-E13 0.89 -1.45 0.50 1.36
RAM-E14 0.64 -1.62 -0.38 3.45
RAM-M1 0.45 -0.12 2.55 2.83
RAM-M2 0.64 -2.38 1.03 2.18
RAM-M3 1.20 -2.98 0.56 1.77
RAM-M4 0.26 3.22 8.27 3.73
RAM-M5 0.15 5.81 -3.68 3.05
RAM-M6 0.34 -3.17 3.40 2.53
RAM-M7 0.54 -0.62 1.43 2.88
RAM-M8 0.75 -0.95 0.41 1.41
RAM-M9 0.73 -0.43 0.55 2.28
RAM-M10 0.73 -2.38 0.39 1.99
RAM-M11 0.23 -0.71 6.83 0.62
RAM-M12 0.49 -0.47 0.97 1.53
RAM-S1 0.49 -2.56 1.27 2.12
RAM-S2 1.97 -3.57 -1.33 -0.08
RAM-S3 1.26 -1.72 0.19 1.57
RAM-S4 1.08 -1.38 0.15 1.46
RAM-S5 0.10 4.39 -3.83 0.97
RAM-S6 0.31 1.40 3.68 3.83
RAM-S7 1.06 -2.27 -0.96 0.49
RAM-S8 1.24 -2.90 -0.78 0.96
RAM-S9 1.75 -2.60 -1.48 -0.22
RAM-S10 1.40 -2.64 -0.01 1.16
RAM-S11 0.61 -2.01 1.76 3.04
RAM-S12 0.42 -0.52 -1.05 2.28
RAM-S13 0.36 -3.04 3.22 3.27
RAM-S14 1.79 -2.18 -0.18 1.1
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Table 3 RAM Scale Items 
Variable Item Factor score 
RAM_E3 Being open to different viewpoints is beneficial. 0.80 
RAM_E6 
It is justified for multiple people to have differing viewpoints 
on the same topic. 0.76 
RAM_E7 
Others' viewpoints are valid even if they're different than my 
own. 0.70 
RAM_E11 There are many reasonable ways to view the world. 0.68 
RAM_E12 
I am not one to judge what other people's preferences or 
viewpoints are. 0.64 
RAM_E13 One person's opinion is as valid as another person's. 0.53 
RAM_M1 There is no absolute standard in morality. 0.77 
RAM_M2 
People's moral judgments are influenced by personal feelings, 
tastes, or opinions and these should vary between people. 0.73 
RAM_M3 
There is often more than one ethical viewpoint that is valid in 
a given situation. 0.71 
RAM_M7 
Moral rules are dependent upon the traditions and practices of 
a person or group of people. 0.68 
RAM_M8 
What is morally good in one context may be morally bad in 
another. 0.66 
RAM_M9 Morality is relative to many things, like cultural standards. 0.62 
RAM_S2 
People's beliefs are context-dependent, in the sense that their 
way of life helps explain why people hold the beliefs they do. 0.79 
RAM_S3 
We can understand differing viewpoints fairly by considering 
the situations out of which they arise. 0.76 
RAM_S4 
One reason why people hold differing beliefs is because 
different situations contribute to differing and possibly 
incompatible viewpoints. 0.75 
RAM_S8 
People speak from their own perspective, which is shaped by 
their unique experiences. 0.65 
RAM_S9 
It is important to understand differing viewpoints by 
appreciating the ways people's ways of life differ. 0.65 
RAM_S14 
It is important to consider the viewpoints of others from the 
perspective of their respective ways of life. 0.64 
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Table 4 Structural Equation Fit Indices From Independence, Hypothesized, and Alternative Models 
Model  df 
Chi-
square  CFI RMSEA 
90% CI for 
RMSEA 
Independence (null) 
model  78 1345.00    
Hypothesized model 1 
Three treatment factors of 
relativism 59 112.11 0.96 0.05 .04-.07 
Alternative models        
2 One treatment factor of situational 
relativism 60 118.61 0.95 0.06 .04-.07 
3 One treatment factor of moral 
relativism 61 197.04 0.89 0.08 .07-.10 
4 One treatment factor of 
epistemological relativism 61 140.04 0.94 0.06 .05-.08 
5 
Two treatment factors of 
situational and moral relativism 62 187.42 0.90 0.08 .07-.09 
6 
Two treatment factors of moral 
and epistemological relativism 62 200.09 0.90 0.08 .07-.10 
7 
Two treatment factors of 
situational and epistemological 
relativism 62 250.67 0.85 0.1 .08-.11 
 
Table 5 Exploratory Regression Models with NFC, IH, and PT 
  Model 1   Model 2   
Variable B (SE) t B (SE) t 
Constant 4.00 (.54) 7.39 5.29 (.59)*** 8.99 
Need for Closure 0.12 (.07) 1.71 0.04 (.07) 0.54 
Intellectual Humility  0.07 (.07) 1.04 0.01 (.06) 0.23 
Perspective Taking  -0.07 (.06) -1.19 -0.00 (.06) -0.17 
Political Ideology  -0.03 (.02) -1.71 -0.04 (.02)* -2.07 
RAME (epistemological)     -0.17 (.05)*** -3.18 
RAMM (moral)     -0.16 (.04)*** -4.04 
RAMS (situational)     0.12 (.06)* 1.94 
        
Model Summary     
R2 0.03**  0.12***  
F (df) 3.26 (4, 323) 7.21 (7, 323) 
     
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001    
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Table 6 Multiple Regression Models Testing for Interactions with Non-Latent RAM Variables 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   
Variable B (SE) t B (SE) t B (SE) t 
Constant 5.31 
(.27)*** 
19.74 6.26 (1.28)*** 4.88 5.93 (4.91) 1.21 
RAME (epistemological) -0.21 
(.05)*** 
-4.28 -0.33 (.29) -1.15 0.26 (1.03) -0.25 
RAMM (moral) -0.15 
(.04)*** 
-4.13 -0.10 (.22) -0.44 -0.03 (1.07) -0.02 
RAMS (situational) 0.14 (.06)** 2.40 -0.15 (.27) -0.55 -0.09 (.93) -0.09 
RAMS x RAME     0.04 (.05) 0.91 0.03 (.19) 0.17 
RAMS x RAMM     0.01 (.04) 0.34 0.00 (.20) 0.00 
RAME x RAMM     -0.03 (.04) -0.67 -0.04 (.22) -0.19 
RAMM x RAME x 
RAMS 
    
    
0.00 (.04) 0.07 
       
Model Summary       
R2 0.12***  0.12***  0.12***  
F (df) 16.14 (3, 326) 8.23 (6, 326) 7.03 (7, 326) 
       
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001      
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Appendix B Figures 
 












Figure 4 Item Characteristic Curve for RAM_E3 
 
 
Figure 5 Item Characteristic Curve for RAM_E6 
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Figure 6 Item Characteristic Curve for RAM_E7 
 
 
Figure 7 Item Characteristic Curve for RAM_E10 
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Figure 8 Item Characteristic Curve for RAM_E11 
 
 
Figure 9 Item Characteristic Curve for RAM_E12 
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Figure 10 Item Characteristic Curve for RAM_E13 
 
 
Figure 11 Item Characteristic Curve for RAM_E14 
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Figure 12 Item Characteristic Curve for RAM_M1 
 
 




Figure 14 Item Characteristic Curve for RAM_M3 
 
 





Figure 16 Item Characteristic Curve for RAM_M8 
 
 





Figure 18 Item Characteristic Curve for RAM_S1 
 
 




Figure 20 Item Characteristic Curve for RAM_S3 
 
 




Figure 22 Item Characteristic Curve for RAM_S7 
 
 




Figure 24 Item Characteristic Curve for RAM_S9 
 
 




Figure 26 Item Characteristic Curve for RAM_S11 
 
 




Figure 28 Item Characteristic Curve for RAM_S14 
 
 




Figure 30 Item Characteristic Curve for RAM_E2_r 
 
 




Figure 32 Item Characteristic Curve for RAM_E5_r 
 
 




Figure 34 Item Characteristic Curve for RAM_E9_r 
 
 




Figure 36 Item Characteristic Curve for RAM_M5_r 
 
 




Figure 38 Item Characteristic Curve for RAM_M10_r 
 
 




Figure 40 Item Characteristic Curve for RAM_S6_r 
 
 




Figure 42 Item Characteristic Curve for RAM_S5_r 
 
 




Figure 44 Hypothesized Model: Three Treatment Factors of Relativism Predicting Naïve Realism 
 
 




Figure 46 Alternative Model: One Treatment Factor of Moral Relativism Predicting Naïve Realism 
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